Defending Temporal Parts Theory

The philosophical debate surrounding the persistence of objects and qualitative change over time is a complex and nuanced discourse. Three primary theories have emerged to explain these phenomena: Temporal Parts Theory, also known as Perdurantism; the Standard View, commonly referred to as Endurantism; and the No-Persistence Theory, advanced by philosophers such as Arnauld and Nicole. Each theory offers a unique perspective on how entities persist through time and undergo change, but this essay aims to defend Temporal Parts Theory as the most coherent and comprehensive explanation.

To understand why Temporal Parts Theory is the preferred choice, it is crucial to first delineate the concepts of persistence through time and qualitative change. Persistence through time refers to the continued existence of an entity at different moments, while qualitative change involves the transformation of an entity's properties over time. For example, a runner persists through time as they run from moment t1 to t2, yet undergo a qualitative change when they take a rest at t2. With these definitions in place, we can delve deeper into the theories themselves.

Temporal Parts Theory

Temporal Parts Theory posits that entities are not wholly present at any single moment but are instead composed of different temporal parts across time, much like how objects have spatial parts. This view treats time as a fourth dimension, akin to the three spatial dimensions, leading to the assertion that objects are four-dimensional entities. Under this framework, a person at time t1 with short hair is a distinct temporal part from the same person at time t2 with long hair. This conceptualization may initially appear counterintuitive, yet it elegantly resolves numerous issues concerning identity over time. One significant advantage of Temporal Parts Theory is its ability to address the problem of identity through change. By viewing entities as a series of connected temporal parts, this theory accommodates the notion that an object can undergo significant qualitative changes while maintaining its identity as a unified whole. For instance, the Ship of Theseus paradox, which questions whether a ship that has had all its parts replaced remains the same ship, finds a compelling solution here. According to Temporal Parts Theory, the ship is a collection of temporal parts, each representing a stage in its existence. This perspective not only explains how the ship remains itself despite change but also affirms its persistence over time.

Critique of Endurantism

The Standard View, or Endurantism, offers an alternative explanation by asserting that entities are wholly present at each moment of their existence. This means that an object persists through time without having temporal parts, leading to the experience of qualitative change. Under this theory, a person notices their hair growth because they are entirely present at each moment of their life. However, this perspective encounters several philosophical challenges. One such challenge is the law of non-contradiction, which states that an entity cannot be both P and not-P simultaneously. If a group of people in an experiment all have short hair at time t1 and then long hair at time t2, Endurantism struggles to explain how they can possess contradictory states within the same entity. The Endurantist might appeal to Prior's theory of Presentism, which posits that only the present exists. Yet, this approach is limited, as not everything can be explained by the present alone. Endurantists may also propose time-indexing, suggesting that each state of an entity is indexed to a specific moment in time. While this addresses some concerns, it can be criticized as an "ad hoc" solution lacking a robust philosophical foundation. Moreover, the multiple location problem for universals, which argues that a universal cannot exist wholly in multiple places simultaneously, presents a significant obstacle. In the context of Endurantism, claiming that an individual can exist in their entirety at more than one time contradicts this principle.

Rejection of No-Persistence Theory

Finally, the No-Persistence Theory challenges the notion of persistence altogether, asserting that no entity truly persists through time. Instead, any qualitative change results in the creation of a new entity. For example, a person with short hair at time t1 and long hair at time t2 would be considered two distinct individuals. While this perspective offers a radical take on identity and change, it is ultimately ontologically untenable and lacks intuitive appeal. The No-Persistence Theory is often illustrated using the Ship of Theseus, where a ship that has undergone complete replacement of its parts is seen as a new ship altogether. This view raises questions about continuity and identity, leading to philosophical difficulties that are challenging to reconcile. Furthermore, it dismisses the intuitive understanding of persistence that underpins our everyday experiences and language. By denying the continuity of identity, the No-Persistence Theory fails to capture the nuanced ways in which entities endure and change over time.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Temporal Parts Theory provides the most comprehensive and coherent explanation of persistence and qualitative change over time among the three theories discussed. By viewing entities as four-dimensional beings with temporal parts, it offers a robust framework for understanding how objects maintain their identity while undergoing change. Unlike Endurantism, which faces challenges related to contradiction and universals, or the No-Persistence Theory, which denies continuity altogether, Temporal Parts Theory strikes a balance between change and persistence. Through its resolution of the Ship of Theseus paradox and its alignment with our intuitive understanding of identity, Temporal Parts Theory emerges as the most compelling account of how entities exist and transform across time.

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